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Abstract: Amongst the most seminal writers who influenced Freud’s thought is the 
one who for two years was his Professor of philosophy at the University of Vienna: 
Franz Brentano. The interlocution between Brentano’s philosophy and Freudian 
psychoanalysis presents itself today as a really broad field of research, made feasible 
after the publication of the letters of youth exchanged between Freud and his friend 
Eduard Silberstein, thanks to which it was possible to affirm with significant degree 
of certainty the whole extent of Brentano’s influence on Freud’s work. The present 
work intends to be inserted in this field of investigations. We argue that it is from the 
Brentanian conception of the psychical phenomenon (psychische Phänomen) that Freud 
will sketch the broad frame of the psychic reality (psychische Realität) as “a special 
form of existence which should not be confused with material reality” (Freud, S. 
Die Traumdeutung, 1914, p. 480). Therefore, we propose to describe the Brentanian 
conception of intentionality present in the Psychologie vom empirischen Standkpunkt 
(1874) and to analyze the resonances of this concept in the Freudian theory of 
representation (Vorstellung). This theory, which reflects Brentano’s most fundamental 
thesis - the impossibility of an act of representation occurring in the absence of a 
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represented object - appears for the first time in the text Zur Auffassung der Aphasien. 
Eine kritische Studie (The Interpretation of Aphasia. A Critical Study) of 1891.
Keywords: Intentionality. Psychic phenomenon (psychisches Phänomen). Psychic 
reality (psychisches Realität). Representation (Vorstellung)
Brentano e Freud: intencionalidade e teoria representacional no “Zur Auffassung 
der Aphasien” (1891)
Resumo: Entre os autores que de maneira mais seminal influenciaram o pensamento 
de Freud encontra-se aquele que por dois anos foi seu professor de filosofia na 
Universidade de Viena: Franz Brentano. A interlocução entre a filosofia de Brentano 
e a psicanálise freudiana apresenta-se, atualmente, como um campo de pesquisa 
realmente amplo, viabilizado após a publicação das cartas de juventude trocadas 
entre Freud e seu amigo Eduard Silberstein, graças às quais foi possível afirmar com 
significativo grau de certeza toda a dimensão da influência de Brentano na obra 
freudiana. O presente trabalho pretende inserir-se neste campo de investigações. 
Sustentamos que é a partir da concepção brentaniana do fenômeno psíquico (psychische 
Phänomen) que Freud desenhará o amplo quadro da realidade psíquica (psychische 
Realität) enquanto “forma especial de existência que não deve ser confundida com a 
realidade material” (Freud, S. Die Traumdeutung, 1914, p. 480). Para tanto, propomo-
nos descrever a concepção brentaniana da intencionalidade presente na Psychologie 
vom empirischen Standkpunkt (1874) e analisar as ressonâncias de tal conceito na teoria 
freudiana da representação (Vorstellung) dos anos 1890. Esta, que reflete a tese mais 
fundamental de Brentano - a impossibilidade de um ato de representação ocorrer na 
ausência de objeto representado - aparece pela primeira vez no texto Zur Auffassung 
der Aphasien. Eine kritische Studie (A Interpretação das Afasias. Um Estudo Crítico), de 
1891.
Palavras-chave: Intencionalidade. Fenômeno Psíquico (psychisches Phänomen). 
Realidade psíquica (psychisches Realität). Representação (Vorstellung).
Introduction
Amongst the most seminal authors who influenced Freud’s thought is the 
one who for two years was his Professor of philosophyat the University of Vienna: 
Franz Brentano (1838-1917). The interlocution between Brentano’s philosophy 
and Freudian psychoanalysis presents itself today as a thought-provoking field 
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of research2. It became feasible only after the publication of the letters of youth 
exchanged between Freud and his friend Eduard Silberstein3, thanks to which it 
was possible to affirm - with a certain degree of certainty - the whole dimension of 
Brentano’s influence in the Freudian work. Until then, there had been little more than 
the paradoxical account of Maria Dorer in his Historichen Grundlagen der Psychanalyse 
(published in 1932), which, even without consulting Freud himself (who was still 
alive and active in the year of publication of that work), concluded that it was 
impossible to prove any direct relations between Freud and Brentano other than 
“purely personal in character” (MERLAN, 1945, p. 375); or the misunderstanding of 
Ernest Jones, for whom Freud would have taken only one “passing glance” (JONES, 
1953, p. 41) in Brentano’s seminars during his time at the University of Vienna. In 
fact, Freud’s “glance” at the philosopher’s classes consisted of attending for four 
academic semesters all the courses offered by Brentano between the winter of 1874 
and the summer semester of 18764 – only philosophical and non-mandatory courses 
attended by Freud, since the University no longer demanded, since 1873, the 
attendance of medical students to philosophical courses (Merlan, apud CATALDO-
MARIA, WINOGRAD, 2013, p. 36; COHEN, 2002, pp. 90, 99-100). 
Correspondence with Silberstein
In any case, it was the access to the letters sent by Freud to his friend 
Silberstein in the period between 1871-1881 which made it possible to review many 
of the inaccuracies regarding his period as a medical student. Among them, it 
problematized the so-called “strictly personal relationship” between Brentano and 
Freud, supposedly devoid of any implications in the latter’s thinking, as well as the 
common notion that Freud would be obstinately refractory to philosophy.
The first mention Freud gives to Brentano in correspondence dates from 30 
October 1874:
(...) in Brentano’s lectures we all meet again. Brentano is doing two lectures, on 
Wednesday and Saturday nights, selected metaphysical questions, and on Fridays at 
2. A history of the studies about the presence of Brentano in the Freudian work and a brief review of the literature 
currently available in English, French and Portuguese is found in our doctoral thesis, Corpo, Natureza, Carne: 
Merleau-Ponty e a reabilitação do naturalismo freudiano (Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 2014), 
p. 50-53. Available at https://repositorio.ufsc.br/xmlui/handle/123456789/129198.
3. The original, Sigmund Freud Jugendbriefe an Eduard Silberstein (Frankfurt: S. Fischer Verlag), was published 
in 1989.
4. At the request of Philip Merlan, Victor Kraft of the University of Vienna, made a survey of the Brentano’s courses 
attended by Freud. They are: “Readings of Philosophical Texts”, in its third (winter of 1874/1875), fourth (summer 
of 1875) and fifth semesters (winter of 1875/1876); “Logic” in its fourth semester and, in the sixth (summer of 1876), 
“Philosophy of Aristotle”.
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night, a paper by Mill on the principle of utility, which we regularly attend (FREUD, 
1995, p. 86).
This passage is valuable because it reveals the importance of Brentano in 
Freud’s contact with the work of Stuart Mill. Already in the first semester as a student 
of Brentano, the work of Stuart Mill was in the center of the attentions of Freud at 
least once a week5. In fact, when one seeks to clarify Freud’s relation to philosophy 
in this period, the names of Brentano and Stuart Mill are the most commonly found 
- although they are not the only ones: Filip Geerardyn and Gertrudis van de Vijver6, 
por example, show the influence of Wilhelm Jerusalem on the conception of the 
Project for a scientific psychology of 1895 (hereinforward called, Project). 
The correspondence with Silberstein shows that Freud’s much-discussed 
repulsion of what he calls “philosophy” does not mean the rejection of the whole 
of the discipline, but rather the echo of Brentano’s rejection of the speculative 
metaphysics of Hegel, Schelling and Fichte7. Brentano, who considered himself a 
natural scientist to work objectively with the experience as his guide, insisted that 
the method of philosophy should be identified with that of natural science and, 
according to Lindenfeld (apud CATALDO-MARIA, WINOGRAD, 2013, p.36), 
had taken upon himself the task of saving the philosophy of the frank decline to 
which it was subjected because of the “excessive speculative orientation of the 
Hegelians.” A committed Empiricist, he believed that he could rise to the absolute 
and self-evident truths of theology and metaphysics from the experience and 
through careful observation and rigorously grounded inductions. The brilliance, 
clarity, logical rigor, seriousness, and competence with which he moved between 
seemingly antagonistic domains - from the most radical and scientific empiricism 
to the most devout Catholicism - not only crowded his lectures but also drew the 
attention of Freud - which, far from considering him a speculative metaphysician, 
saw in him a “remarkable man (...), Darwinian (…), even genial”8 (FREUD, 1995, p. 
5. In addition to the work of Stuart Mill, in the third semester of Freud’s medical school he studied “selected 
metaphysical questions” presented in lectures that happened twice a week. About them, he writes to Silberstein: 
“One of them treats - listen and amaze! - of the existence of God, since Professor Brentano, who presents them, is 
a splendid person, a scholar and a philosopher, although he finds it necessary to sustain the diaphanous existence of 
God with his opinions “(FREUD, 1995, p. November 8, 1874). The reference to this trait of Brentano is recurrent in 
Freud’s letters.
6. GEERARDYN, F. Freud’s Theory on Aphasia Revisited: Epistemological and Clinical Implication; VAN DE 
VIJVER, G. On the Origins of Psychic Structure: a Case-Study Revisited on the Basis of Freud’s ‘Project’. In: VAN 
DE VIJVER, G; GEERARDYN, F. (Ed.). The Pre-Psychoanalytic Writings of Sigmund Freud. London: Karnac 
Books, 2002, pp. 36-44, 190-206.
7. In a letter of January 30, 1927 addressed to Werner Achelis, the psychoanalyst says he believes “that metaphysics 
will one day be seen as a nuisance, as a misuse of thought, as a survival from the period of religious world view, and 
it will be judged thus” (Freud, apud COHEN, 2002, p. 90).
8. Letter to Silberstein on March 7th 1875.
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115). In fact, Brentano inspired in his pupils a lasting devotion to the “truth” and to 
the philosophy - as well as to his own charismatic figure (Cohen 2002: 89).
Thus, academic records and correspondence with Silberstein allow us to 
realize that Freud’s interest in Brentano was much more consistent than hitherto 
admitted by his biographers. Between the winter of 1874 and the end of the summer 
semester of 1876, Freud attended to Brentano’s seminars three or more times during 
the week. His interest in Feuerbach appeared in Brentano’s courses, during which 
he began the study of psychology. From Stuart-Mill’s study in his master’s classes, 
Freud was introduced to psychology long before he graduated in medicine or from 
interning with Charcot (1885-1886). Under his influence, he had even reviewed the 
resolute materialism with which he identified himself in 1875, canceled a season 
he would spend in Berlin studying with the exponents of that school, and made 
mention of a doctorate in philosophy:
For now, the novelty of having matured, especially under the current influence of 
Brentano, the decision to obtain my doctorate of philosophy based on philosophy 
and zoology; other discussions are in progress to promote my entrance to the Faculty 
of Philosophy, or next semester, or the next year9 (FREUD, 1995, p. 115).
Not even the mistrust “greater than ever” in relation to philosophy”10 (id. p. 
148) who had confessed to his friend after a trip to England (from late July to early 
September 1875) to visit his half-brother, Emanuel, prevented him from enrolling 
in the course offered by Brentano in 1876 entitled “The Philosophy of Aristotle 
“. Nevertheless, it is also true that the correspondence with Silberstein provides 
evidence of Freud’s ambivalent position on philosophy and on the master himself. 
In any case, we share the opinion of Aviva Cohen that there is ample evidence that 
“Brentano’s philosophical and psychological teachings had a significant impact of 
Freud’s theoretical development” (COHEN, 2002, p. 89).
In fact, Freud soon realized that he could not explain neurotic disorders - in 
particular hysteria - nor by his neurophysiological record alone (for which hysteria 
had long been seen as concealment and deception), nor by his “purely” psychological 
dimension (Freud realized this by seeing that hypnosis, rather than exhausting the 
manifestation of hysteria, dislocated its symptomatology); nevertheless, he found 
in Brentano elements necessary for the articulation between the psychological and 
the physiological which, expressed more forcefully in his “pre-psychoanalytic” 
writings, permeate all his work in the unfoldings he performs in the concept of 
drive. We argue that it is from the Brentanian conception of the psychic fenomenom 
(psychische Phänomen) that Freud will sketch the broad frame of the psychic reality 
(psychische Realität), in which the drive operates as a “limit concept” between the 
9. Id.
10. Letter to Silberstein on September 9th 1875.
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soul and the somatic (FREUD, 1915/2004, p. 148) – which does not imply postulating an 
identity between the two notions. It is thanks to the contact with Brentanian psychology 
that Freud can affirm, in the Traumdeutung, that “psychic reality is a special form of 
existence that should not be confused with reality material”11 (FREUD, 1900a/1991, 
p. 607). We propose, in this work, to describe the Brentanian conception of 
intentionality as it appears in the Psychologie vom empirischen Standpundt of 1874 
(hereinafter,Psychologie) - Brentano’s work that most presents resonances in Freud’s 
initial thinking - and to analyze the resonances of such a concept in Freud’s theory 
of representation (Vorstellung). This one, which reflects Brentano’s most fundamental 
thesis - the impossibility of an act of representation occurring in the absence of a 
represented object - appears for the first time in the text Zur Auffassung der Aphasien. 
Eine kritische Studie 12, of 1891 (hereinafter, Aphasia). 
Intentionality, principle of demarcation of 
psychic phenomena
After his habilitation to teaching with the Habilitationsschrift called Die 
Psychologie des Aristoteles13 (University of Würzburg, 1867), Brentano began to work 
around the foundations of psychology. This research resulted, among others, the 
Psychologie. One of its most important principles was that philosophy is void without 
recourse to the method of the natural sciences - a principle which is reflected in its 
empirical approach to psychology. For him, there would be no other valid scientific 
method but the positivist method. However, his use of the term “empirical” is very 
different from the present one: Brentano emphasized that all our knowledge should 
be based on direct experience, not in the form of a theory described in third person, 
but in a form of introspection: psychology from an empirical point of view means, 
for him, to describe what one experiences directly in the inner perception, in a theory 
described in first person.
Brentano distinguished between genetic psychology and empirical or 
descriptive psychology - distinction that is thematized in his Descriptive Psychology 
(1982). The former studies psychological phenomena from a third-person point of 
view, using empirical tools. The second - which is sometimes called phenomenology 
(BRENTANO, 2002, p. 137s) – is intended to describe the awareness of a first-person 
viewpoint; it aims to list fully “the basic components out of which everything 
11. “(D)ie psychische Realitäteine besondere Existenzform ist, welche mit der faktischen Realität nicht verwechselt 
werden soll” (FREUD, 1900b/1914, p. 480).
12. Leipzig/Viena: Franz Duticke, 1891.
13. Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom nous poietikos. Mainz: Verlag Franz 
Kirchheim, 1867.
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internally perceived by humans is composed” and list “the ways in which 
these components can be connected” (BRENTANO, 1982/2002, p. 2). His main 
objective was to lay the foundations for a scientific psychology, defined by him 
as “the science of psychic phenomena” 14 (BRENTANO, 1874, p. 25). Contrary to 
what Heaton asserts (1981, p. 163), it is an empirical psychology and not a “soul 
science” with metaphysical commitments. Defining Brentanian psychology as “the 
science of the soul,” Heaton says that Brentano saw in the soul a substance that 
has sensations - perceptual images and fantasies, acts of memory, expectancy or 
fear, desire or aversion; by substance, an entity in which other things subsist but 
which, itself, subsists in nothing, “the ultimate subject.” Nothing further from the 
philosopher’s ideal of empirical psychology. The ontological status of extra-mental 
objects or of the mind itself is not, in Brentano’s thought, the subject of a scientific 
psychology, but rather the relations between phenomena - which is why he chooses 
psychic phenomena as the object of his psychology. And to avoid constructing a 
psychology on the assumption of a substance, Brentano takes up the Aristotelian 
distinction between act and potency and develops a philosophy of the psychic. By 
recoursing to Aristotle, he recovers a definition of soul that characterizes it as an act 
that is directed at an object that exists only intentionally. Reality translates into act, 
in opposition to the potency that the correlates have to be or not existent; hence the 
act Wirklichkeit, reality. Only the psychic phenomena are real, since the intentional 
acts are real. Intentional correlates have another ontological nature, regardless of 
whether they exist in themselves beyond phenomena.
At Psychologie, he proposes six criteria to distinguish mental phenomena 
and physical phenomena, of which we highlight two:
(i) Psychic phenomena are the exclusive object of inner perception (innere 
Wahrnehmung). Psychic phenomena, argues Brentano, “are only perceived in inner 
consciousness, while in the case of physical phenomena only external perception 
is possible” (BRENTANO, 1874, p. 118; BRENTANO, 2009, p. 70). According to 
him, the innere Wahrnehmung (which is the only form of perception in the strict 
sense) provides evidence of what is properly true15 due to its immediacy and 
greater evidence in relation to the external, sensory experience. However, internal 
perception should not be confused with internal observation; that is, it should not be 
conceived as “a full-fledged act accompanying another mental act toward which it 
is directed” (HUEMER, 2010, p. 5). Rather, it is intertwined with internal observation, 
that is: in addition to being primarily directed at an object, each act is incidentally 
directed at itself as a secondary object - the subject’s consciousness of being involved 
in a cognitive process. As in the evidence of the Cartesian cogito, I can question 
the truth or falsity of an object of thought, although I can not doubt the fact of 
14. “Wissenschaft von der psychische Phäenomenen”.
15. Huemer (2010, p.5) notes that the German word for perception, Wahrnehmung, literally means „taking-true”.
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thinking. Therefore there would be no unconscious mental acts, only mental acts 
of different degrees of intensity; moreover, the degree of intensity with which the 
object is represented is equal to the degree of intensity with which the secondary 
object - that is, the act itself - is represented. 
(ii) Psychic phenomena are always intentionally directed to an object. The 
intentionality is the original notion recovered by Brentano in contemporary 
philosophy. Its classical formulation - although ambiguous - is present in the 
Psychologie:
Every mental phenomenon (psychische Phänomen) is characterized by what the 
Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental [mentale]16) inexistence 
of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference 
to a content (die Beziehung auf einen Inhalt), direction toward an object (Kichtung auf 
ein Object) ((which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing [eine Realität]), or 
immanent objectivity (immanente Gegenständlichkeit) (BRENTANO, 1874/2009, p. 68). 
For the medieval Scholastics (of which Brentano takes up the notion), the 
term “intentional inexistence” is locative rather than negative, that is, it aims to 
characterize a specific modality of existence - existence to something or to someone 
(CATALDO-MARIA, WINOGRAD, 2013, p. 39). In Thomistic philosophy, the intentio 
(that through which one knows something, a species through which one knows 
something intellectually) enabled the preservation of the essence in the intellectual 
representation, even though its existence was no longer physical, but psychic - in 
a typical moderated realism. The preservation of essence in mental representation 
protected the realism of knowledge. Both the application of the spirit to an object 
of knowledge and the very content of the thought to which the spirit applies; taken 
over by Brentano, intentionality becomes the principle of demarcation of psychic 
phenomena (KRIEGEL, 2017, p. 100). Huemer (2010, p. 6) points out that, despite the 
ambiguity of the definition present in Psychologie, Brentano’s purpose was to work 
16. It is worth noting the translation option adopted by the translators of the Routledge edition of Psychologie, Antos 
C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell and Linda L.McAlister (BRENTANO, 1874/2009), who translated both the German 
adjectives psychische and mentale by mental. It is striking that the English language, like the German language, 
has other adjectives to qualify the phenomena to which Brentano referred, and which, in our view, are closer to the 
etymology of the German original: psychic or their derived form, psychichal. Such an option seems to be justified by 
the intention to avoid any psychological interpretation of intentionality and to underline the effectiveness of psychic 
acts - that is, their conscious effectiveness. Apart from the psychologist’s interpretation (which reduces logical 
and semantic laws to individual psychic subjectivity), the use of  psychic to delimit the species of phenomena on 
which Brentano is concerned is the option adopted in this work. In addition, Benito Müller, translator of Deskriptive 
Psychologie, bypasses the above complications and translates psychische into psychich or psychichal, like in 
“psychichal acts” (BRENTANO, 2002, p. 89s). It should be noted here that Freud (whose translation of works to 
English underwent pragmatic linguistic standardizations, with the aim of facilitating the diffusion of psychoanalysis 
rather than preserving the original conceptual complexity) mirrors Brentano even describes the field of action of 
the psychoanalytic method as the domain of “psychic reality” (psychische Realität), but extrapolates the conscious 
mental domain by including in its structure the unconscious instinctual (organic, biological) dimension as a substrate 
from which conscious perception is no more than a differentiation.
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out a ultimate criterion of distinction between mental and physical phenomena, and 
not develop a systematic approach to intentionality. Thus, it is psychic that phenomenon 
characterized by intentional in-existence of its object or, what is the same, that mental 
act that has its correlate or whose object is intentionally existent. That is why we 
read, in the Psychologie: “Nothing distinguishes mental phenomena from physical 
phenomena more than the fact that something is immanent as an object in them” 
(BRENTANO, 2009, p. 152).
Therefore, at Psychologie, the definition of psychic phenomena highlights its 
exclusive property in the face of physical phenomena: the latter have spatial location 
as property, while psychic phenomena possess the property of the (intentional) 
inexistence of its object and are immediately apprehended in the inner perception. 
The examples of physical phenomena to which Brentano refers are those of exact 
sciences (mathematics, physics, chemistry, physiology), such as color and sound. 
For him, the internal perception of the objects referenced by the direct complement 
of verbs such as see, hear, smell etc. is, as a mental act, a psychic phenomenon. And 
there is no psychic phenomenon other than a relation between an act and a content 
of the act. This is intentionality: the proper relation of the act that represents an 
object that does not exist intentionally in itself.
What, then, is the psychic phenomenon? Brentano presents it as a mental act 
defined by a verb (see, hear, smell, etc.) characterized by possessing a correlate – this 
is, the intentionally existent object “what should not be understood (...) as meaning a 
thing” (“eine Realität”); in other words, an inexistent object. With this the philosopher 
redefines the concept de representation (Vorstellung)17: this one is an act that refers 
to an inexistent correlate, a fundamental psychic phenomenon characterized by the 
intentional inexistence of the object. Amidst the modern philosophical tradition, 
which tended to emphasize the content of representations, Brentano emphasizes 
their effective, actual character; for him, Vorstellung refers not to “that which is 
presented, but rather the act of presentation” (BRENTANO, 1874/2009, p. 60). And 
both the act of representing and the object represented are independent of the real 
existence of things (Realitäten), which do not imply the acceptance of the idealist 
thesis that denies the existence of the external object to consciousness: faithful to the 
Aristotelian tradition, Brentano describes Vorstellung not just as a reproduction of the 
external object, but as a whole formed by the relation that the Vorstellungen stablish 
between them.
17. The adopted English edition translates Vorstellung by presentation and, more rarely, idea or thought; vorgestellt, 
in turn, is expressed by one of the variations of to think of - from the German verb vorstellen (Linda McAlister, apud 
BRENTANO, 2009, p. xxi). In the Brentano translation history other alternatives have been used to shed Vorstellung, 
such as representation and contemplation (KRIEGEL, 2017, p.102). The Routledge edition option accentuates the 
representational mode of the Vorstellung phenomenon: it is a psychic phenomenon characterized by the “neutral” 
in-existence, we would say, of its intentional correlate, present to the mind as the most basic foundation or class of 
states of judgment or interest. Aware that other translations are possible and that the meanings of the German word 
vary in Brentano and Freud, we chose to translate Vorstellung, here, by representation.
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The intentional object to which we are directed is then a “divisive,” a non-
independent part of the psychic phenomenon. This is why Brentano attaches to the 
definition of intentionality the representational modes in which the mind is directed 
to its objects: after all, “For this reason it is easy to understand that the fundamental 
differences in the way something exists in them as an object constitute the principal 
class differences among mental phenomena” (id., p. 152). 
Freud‘s theory of representation in “Zur 
Auffassung der Aphasien” 
Brentano’s thesis of intentionality underlines the difference between psychic 
phenomena and physical phenomena and serves as the principle of demarcation of 
the former. It prays that every mental act contains its object in its interior, although 
there are different ways in which the act can be directed to its immanent object. 
The philosopher argues that we are immediately certain of the reality of an inner 
perception, whereas our knowledge of external realities is, as a perception of sensible 
qualities, obtained through secondary mechanisms. 
Mental representations are not just reproductions of external objects; on 
the contrary, representation is the only thing endowed with reality, since it refers 
exclusively to the act of representing. That is, there is no reality in the contents of 
consciousness, but only in the activity of consciousness. The representation is then 
the act by which the object is intentionally present in the mind, independently of the 
extra-mental existence of the thing to which the representation refers. Its meaning 
stems not from the represented thing, but from the relation established between the 
representations (GARCIA-ROZA, 2008, p 57). This becomes particularly noticeable 
from Meinong’s criticism. The first Brentanian theory of intentionality (prior to the 
turning point of 1905) assumed that, in addition to Wirklichkeit of acts of conscience 
there would also be the Realität of things, to whose subjects the mental acts could 
or would not refer; in both cases, the directionality of consciousness to an object, 
regardless of its material existence or not, remained real.18.
As the basic units of mental functioning, nothing can awaken interest or 
be judged (the two other fundamental classes of psychic phenomena described in 
18. Criticisms of the ontological status of the intentional object have made Brentano revise this assumption 
to the point of admitting that although the concrete individuals are the only ones endowed with existence, the 
evidence of the inner perception does not allow us, as far as knowledge is concerned, go beyond the phenomena 
as apprehended in acts of conscience. Hence the sense of the phenomenon or psychic act does not come from 
its veritative-correspondential potential, but from the relations established between the representations; or, 
in García-Roza’s words (2008, p. 58-59), “there is meaning even when the representation does not have as 
reference a real object, existing in and of itself, as is the case, for example, of the centaur or winged horse”.
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Psychologie) if it was not first represented to the mind; that is, each mental act contains 
the same object as the representation to which it is connected (BRENTANO, 2009, 
p. 156). There is no difference at the object, independent of the mental act (to love, to 
hate, to affirm or to deny) that it is directed to him. While the nature of the mental 
act may differ, the intentional object remains the same.
Thus, Brentano seems to have been the first author to free the psyche from 
the dependence of a physicalistic explanation. The psychic, for him, is a whole that 
is formed between parts without it being necessary to point out the cause or what 
determines it; these are phenomena whose meaning does not necessarily result from 
the articulation between mental representation and the represented thing, but from 
the articulation between the representations themselves. It is a mysterious whole, 
“original association” whose interdependent parts are not the serial effect of causes 
external to themselves nor can they be reduced to physiological processes.
Freud, at the time of the writing of Aphasia, rejected a serial ordering 
between physiology and psychology according to which the psychic phenomenon 
can be reduced to an epiphenomenon of the physiological (GARCIA-ROZA, 2008, 
page 55). For him, the chain of physiological processes is not in a mechanistic causal 
relationship with the psychic processes. Except for the metaphysical presuppositions 
of one and the other, for Brentano, as for Freud, the psychic phenomenon and the 
physiological phenomenon are different and irreducible to each other. The index of 
such difference is the intentional presence of the object in the psychic phenomenon.
Garcia-Roza maintains the importance of Brentano in the early days of 
psychoanalysis, claiming to be the author in philosophy capable of sponsoring the 
conception of object-representation (Objectvorstellung) as defended by Freud and lead 
him to describe the articulation between it and a word-representation (Wortvorstellung) 
in the production of meaning - which is always a linguistic meaning (ibid., p. 55, 59). 
Such notions are of fundamental importance in the Freudian corpus. They are already 
in Aphasia, where the concept of Objectvorstellung while a criticism of locationalism 
is expression of the presence of the Brentanism in Freud’s thought.
The main target of that text was the theory of the cerebral locations. The 
Meynertian reticularist locationism affirmed a point-to-point relation between 
stimuli coming from the external world and representations located in certain 
points of the cerebral cortex, in such a way that the representations corresponded 
to a projection of the elements of the periphery of the nervous system in the cortical 
tissue. 
The idea was that a representation was the mechanical effect of peripheral stimulation, 
or more broadly, the idea that the psychological process is an epiphenomenon or a 
mechanical duplication of the physiological process (Garcia-Roza, apud CATALDO-
MARIA, WINOGRAD, 2013, p. 39). 
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Such causality between physical and psychological phenomena, based 
on the description of the nervous system according to which bundles of fibers 
intercommunicated their different parts, was called into question by the observations 
of John Hughlings-Jackson; these made it appear that nerve fibers crossed different 
strata of brain tissue from the medulla to the cortex, in which certain ways of 
conducting the stimuli were closed, and different paths were initiated. This 
observation led Jackson to replace the idea of the location of brain functions in the 
cortex by the dynamic notion of processes that would involve various parts of the 
organ, or even the whole nervous system19.
Responding to Charcot - for whom the functional injury responsible for the 
hysterical disorder would be located in the cortical tissue -, Freud affirms that the 
dynamic brain processes are always and necessarily globals; even in the case where 
there are material lesions in the nervous tissue, the resulting disorder is explained 
by a pattern of reaction of cortical activity to the functional disorganization caused 
by organic trauma, and not by the attribution, to the injured region, the role of basis 
of the lost or impaired function, as locationalism wanted (SIMANKE, 2005, p. 18). 
Influenced by him, Freud saw in hysteria a functional disturbance, that is, a disturbance 
that happens due to the impossibility of innervation of a certain circuit by the other 
cortical processes. It was already his intuition, from the time of his internship in 
the Salpêtriere, that the hysterical paralysis, given his precise location in the body, 
would be the result of a lesion in the conception of the affected organ - that is, that 
part of the body to which the name “arm”, “leg”, “hips”, etc., is commonly and 
conventionally attributed. In the article “Hysteria” (Freud, 1888/1991), Freud had 
already affirmed that the clinical observation evidenced changes that since their 
establishment exclude any suspicion of physical injury, which made him support 
the thesis that hysteria would represent a case of constitutional anomaly rather 
than an anatomically circumscribed disease. Revealed and undone by hypnosis the 
trauma that invested with affection the representation of the limb, paralysis tended 
to disappear or manifest in another organ.
In  Aphasia, when describing a theory about the language apparatus without 
any localizationist reference, Freud reccurs to two basic notions: it is by distinguishing 
19. In this respect, the English neurologist (remembered mainly for his contributions in the study of epilepsy) 
postulated the existence of three levels in the organization of the nervous system: in the most basic, movements 
are represented in their less complex form, and the nervous centers responsible for they are located in the 
marrow; the intermediate level is located in the motor area of  the cortex, and the highest levels in the prefrontal 
cortex. From Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), Jackson states that certain epilepsy symptoms are cases of functional 
retrogression, that is: a disturbance that occurred at a higher level, which previously inhibited the functioning 
of the most basic centers, then manifests a negative symptom due to the lack of function of the first one. This 
explains, for example, the permanence of a pre-propositional emotional language, the significant use of simple 
expressions of very frequent use, such as “yes” and “no”, etc. Thus, while on the one hand Hughlings-Jackson 
retakes the functional paradigm applied to the centers or nervous areas - as Broca (1824-1880) -, on the other, 
explains the pathology from the idea of  a generalized dynamic disorder in the nervous system.
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between word-representation and object-representation that the psychoanalyst is able 
to deal with that other type of lesions postulated by Charcot, the purely functional 
ones - those in which the associative isolation, with the consequent impossibility of 
innervation of a certain cortical circuit, happens without a physical trauma, but only 
by the vicissitudes of the dynamic processes that constitute the cortical activity.
Freud further proposes that physiological and psychological processes 
would be dependent concomitants: “(the) psychic is... a process parallel to the 
physiological one (ein Parallelvorgang des Physiologischen), (a concomitant dependent) 
(FREUD, 1891, p 57; FREUD 1977, 56). There would be a kind of parallelism between 
the sensory and neurophysiological processes and the psychological processes, 
from whose interrelation and imbrication results the psychic reality. To suppose 
a correlation between the series did not imply admitting a mechanical causality; at 
the same time, Freud did not refuse the anatomical or depart from the neurological 
aspect, but maintained that there was no psychological scheme without a neurological 
scheme20. Freud thus excluded the mechanical causality of psychological processes, 
which were seen as effects of somatic processes.
The concomitance between somatic functions and psychic manifestations 
appears in the definition of object-representation present in Aphasia. The young doctor 
presents it as “an associative complex of the most diverse visual representations, 
acoustic, tactile, kinesthetic, etc.,” a definition that would have been learned from 
“philosophy”. Freud refers here to the philosophy of Stuart-Mill21; adds that the 
perception of a thing endowed with “properties” comes only from additional 
associations in the same chain, that is, “to the extent that in the range of the sensory 
impressions obtained by an object we also include the possibility of a long succession 
of new impressions in the the same associative chain”(FREUD, 1891, pp. 79-80, 
FREUD, 1977, p. 71).
20. For this purpose, the postulation of facilitated pathways between neurons producing associations between 
mnemonic traits and representations due to differences in the caliber of the neuron axis (FREUD, 1895/2003, p.177) 
and, on the other hand, the description of the Ego as an associative complex (formed by facilitated ways) capable of 
disturbing excitatory flows and moderating the primary processes in spite of such organic dispositions (id., p. 204).
21. In a note (FREUD, 1977, p. 71, note 27), he cites chapter III, Book I of A System of Logic Ratiocinative and 
Inductive (1843) and An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy (1861). In a letter to Eduard Silberstein 
of 22 and 23 October 1874, Freud mentions Brentano’s lecture on Utilitarianism of Mill. In another letter, dated 
March 15, 1875, he writes that Brentano recommends to his students the reading of Locke and Hume, and 
also that he speaks of the latter as the most exemplary of philosophers. Brentano had just published his 
Psychologie, in which he also examines the psychology of Hamilton and the Mills. In 1875, when Freud was 
taking Brentano’s psychology course, both discussed the laws of idea association of both Mills, father and 
son. Freud was thus well informed about the general lines of this particular associationist tradition and about 
Mill’s clashes with the conceptual current, and borrows from Stuart-Mill a kind of psychological phenomena 
in which, instead of describing the mental facts in search of the more primitive ones, one should examine their 
modes of production in order not to incur the error of taking as simple the composite representation whose 
production processes were lost. Along with the psychological analysis, Freud also presupposes that association 
laws based on the phenomena.
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At that point, in Aphasia, Freud discusses the idea that the word acquires 
meaning by being linked to an object-representation. With regard to the 
representational theory that Freud elaborates on Aphasia, the main contribution of 
Stuart-Mill consists in the open character of the object-representation. Interested in 
unraveling the psychology of the concept of substance, the philosopher describes 
the object as the fruit of the present sensations as well as of an enormous number 
of possibilities of sensations that form the associative series of the object complex. 
This is why, in the Freudian text of 1891, the object-representation, compared to the 
word-representation, constitutes an open associative complex.
Freud does not deny the existence of impressions, but rather the idea 
that ideas are reproduction of impressions - an accent typical of the empiricists 
who advocate a kind of “mental mechanics”. The psychoanalyst thus elaborates a 
distinct and irreducible representational theory (even to Brentano’s): he rejects the 
conception of representation as the mechanical effect of external stimulation or as a 
mental reproduction of the external object, refers it to its neural basis and presents 
it as a construction whose meaning would derive from the relation that the various 
representations maintain among themselves. To realize this implies solving many 
difficulties usually identified in metapsychology - namely, those concerning the 
status of the unconscious system and the primary process22. 
This is why, according to Garcia-Roza (2008, p. 63), the best translation 
would be Objectvorstellung by object-representation, and not by representation of object23, 
because it is not a referential reproduction of the external object, but a totality whose 
meaning is relational and which includes elements of different orders - that is, the 
neuronal substrate and its conscious and unconscious psychological manifestations.
The basic units of representations are what the psychoanalyst will come to 
name mnemic traits24 associated with each other. Through them, a representation 
would be linked to others, forming the network of representations that make up the 
psyche.
22. In the neuropsychology that Freud previously developed to Traumdeutung there is a tendency to identify as 
unconscious those processes, mechanisms, and representations that take place in the brain tissue or the nervous 
system in their entirety. This is how we read, in the 1888 article on hysteria: “(...) hysteria is an anomaly of 
the nervous system, resting on a diverse distribution of excitations, probably forming a surplus of excitation 
within the soul organ. Its symptomatology shows that this surplus is distributed on conscious or unconscious 
representations” (FREUD, 1888/1992, p. 62-63, our griffin). 
23. Present for example, in the French version of the text, made by Claude van Reeth. Refusing the biologicist tone 
of psychoanalysis he translates the terms into représentation de mot and représentation d’object, respectively. See 
FREUD, S. Contribution à la conception des aphasies. Une étude critique. Paris: PUF, 2002, p. 127s.
24. The notion used by Freud throughout his work to designate the way stimuli are inscribed in memory, deposited 
in the various systems (unconscious, preconscious and conscious). In the 1895 Project, it designates the smallest 
associative unit registered in the cortical tissue through a facilitation (Bahnung) - that is, between a facilitation and a 
sensitive image recorded in cortical tissue.
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 Thus, the representations would be formed by the association between 
the so-called object-associations (Object-Associationen) and word-representations 
(Wortvorstellungen). The first are an open associative set formed by images that 
will give rise to the object-representation. To form an object-representation, such 
associated images are linked to the word-representation through its sensorial ends – 
this means, the acustic image of the word representation is linked to the visual image 
of the object-representation (FREUD, 1977, p 72). It is from this connection that the 
object-representation gains unity and identity, and the word representation, in turn, 
acquires meaning.
The object-representation therefore designates the meaning of the word-
representation. This one, in turn, is a “closed complex of representations” (FREUD, 
1891, p. 79; FREUD, 1977, p. 71) formed by several simple representations - such 
as the acoustic image of the word, its motor image, image of reading and writing. 
Their association is only possible because of the relationship between a language 
apparatus and another language apparatus. It is a transitive relation in which the 
word acquires meaning by its connection with the object-representation at the same 
time that the represented object acquires identity when articulated to the word-
representation, and it is this articulation that allows the formation of the concept. 
Thus in Freud the objects of perception constitute independently of a conscious 
judicial act (consciousness is, in Freud, only a quality of the psychic, not its total 
expression). Put another way, the object-representation designates precisely the 
(open) set of the unconscious system in that it is tributary to nervous biology.
In Freud, as in Brentano, it is necessary that an act of representation occurs 
in the presence of a represented object, which does not imply that the represented 
object exists as a thing independent of thought. Although the external thing provides 
the sensory stimuli that will constitute the raw material of the object-representation, 
the representation is not representation of the external thing (eine Realität); after all, 
although it obtains its sensitive elements from the thing in the passivity of the 
sensibility, the object only constitutes itself as such in its connection with the word. 
To assert that the word representation acquires its signification by the connection 
with the object-representation is to affirm, as Brentano, that the meaning results 
from the articulation among representations, and not from the articulation between 
the representation and the extra-mental entity. Hence, just as the centaur may 
be inexistent (i.e., existent under intentional mode) in the neutral relation of the 
mental act which is the Vorstellung, the word representation can refer to multiple 
object representations whose meaning is rather expressive than judicial. In this way, 
intentionality sheds light on the affective status Freud attributes to the representation 
of the sexual object: it is capable of triggering all the dynamics of endogenous 
summation in the absence of an object external to the psychic apparatus. Put another 
way, the symbolic relation is a “precondition for the establishment of the sign,” 
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and the relationship between word-representation and object-representation allows 
the language apparatus to produce original objects according to “particular object 
associations” - signs which, because they are generated by the apparatus itself, are 
arbitrary (GARCIA-ROZA, 2008, p. 64).  
Thus, as Cataldo-Maria and Winograd write, “representations overlap one 
another, and in this process, the associative complex not only expands, but reorganizes 
and acquires new characteristics” (CATALOG-MARIA, WINOGRAD, 2013, p. 
40). Meaning, as effect of the connections between representations, presupposes 
that the properties of complex representations do not consist merely of the sum 
of the properties of “simple” representations, for “new properties emerge from 
associations between representations” (ibid. p. 41). Freud gives representational 
associations a description analogous to chemical synthesis, in which one can not infer 
the characteristics of complex representation from the analysis of their component 
elements taken in isolation. This way:
(...) representation is a mental construct in which sensory information is reorganized 
successively throughout its capture of the external world and its treatment in the 
pathways of the nervous system and the psychic apparatus (that is, it is not only 
what is passively grasped of the external world) (id., ibid.).
This is the original meaning of Freud’s representational theory: it is not, 
as in localizationism, a point-to-point mirroring in consciousness of sensory 
impressions from the periphery of the nervous system; nor is it the question of 
the induction of principles of association between ideas whose mechanism would 
come from the objective relation between representations within consciousness. 
Before, we are faced with an organization always open to new arrangements, 
established between associated representations in the cortical tissue whose material 
is the visual, acoustic and kinaesthetic images of internal or external origin coming 
from the periphery of the nervous system - that is, from the sensitive experience. 
What Freud does here is to ascribe to the neuronal apparatus the representative 
capacity which the modern tradition ascribed only  to consciousness (cogitatio). 
In this way, he expands the concept of psychism, including unconscious cortical 
representations, that is, complex associations between images of visual, acoustic 
or kinaesthetic origin registered in the cortical tissue that, if on the one hand they 
make sense when connecting to a word-representation, on the other hand it keeps 
open the possibilities of recombination, which gives a remarkable plasticity to the 
representation.
To assert, as Brentano, that representation is a psychic phenomenon that 
intentionally contains its inexistent object does not refer us to a consciousness 
that constitutes the object according to its own categories (Kant), whether it 
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exists (Descartes), is real (Husserl) or negative (Sartre); rather, it indicates that 
representation takes place in an act, and that the source of the stability and identity of 
representations is not indirect and abstract, but experiential, effective, not separate.
It is thus understood that the conscious is “the correlate of a process that 
represents the last stage in the reorganization of sensory information” (id. ibid.). 
The stages of construction of our representations are not themselves conscious, 
and our access to the stimuli coming from the external world occurs indirectly, 
mediated by this processual reorganization that takes place in the nervous system 
and in the psychic apparatus. With this, it seems clear that the Brentanian notion 
of representation contributed, if not to the construction of the theoretical body of 
psychoanalysis as a whole, at least for the concept of representation that underlies 
it.
Beyond the intentionality, Stuart-Mill
Nevertheless, as we have seen, Freud credits John Stuart-Mill with the 
philosophical inspiration of such a thesis. Garcia-Roza, followed by Cataldo-Maria 
and Winograd, points this credit, albeit indirectly, towards Brentano, because of the 
clarification that the philosophy of this author can provide in the understanding 
of the articulation between word-representation and object-representation in 
the production of meaning (GARCIA-ROZA, 2008, p. 59; CATALOG-MARIA, 
WINOGRAD, 2013, p. 42). In any case, it is Brentano’s merit to have introduced 
Freud to Stuart-Mill’s philosophy.
Specifically, the influence of the English philosopher is felt in Freud’s 
statement that “(...) in the range of sensory impressions obtained by an object we 
also include the possibility of a long succession of new impressions in the same 
associative chain” (FREUD , 1977, p. 71). To understand it, we must consider two 
aspects.
First, contrary to the “mechanical” conception of his father, James Mill - for 
whom the association of ideas was a simple combination of elements kept unchanged 
in the whole formed by them - John Stuart-Mill proposes, concerning the association 
between representations, what he calls “mental chemistry” (STUART-MILL, 1872, 
p. 441).  According to him, the associative set resulting from the combined elements 
is not a simple sum of these elements, but a product generated from them, whose 
properties are irreducible to the properties of the separate elements (as occurs with 
water in relation to its constituent elements)25. “These therefore are cases”, as written 
by Stuart-Mill, “of mental chemistry: in which it is proper to say that the simple 
ideas generate, rather than that they compose, the complex ones.” (id., p. 441-442). 
25. See, above, Freud on the properties of complex representations.
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Keeping the properties of the simple elements unchanged, the chemical conception 
of the mental allows an unlimited generation of new sets with new properties - 
which was not possible from a mechanistic perspective. By this, it seems to us that 
the English philosopher is sketching an emergentistic conception of the mental 
which finds resonances in the Project of Freud. 
Secondly, we must consider the conception of matter of the English 
philosopher and his presence in the Freudian text. In An Examination of Sir William 
Hamilton’s Philosophy – where he exposes the psychological theory of belief in an 
outside world - Stuart-Mill attributes to the human mind expectancy capacity, that is, 
the ability to form, after real sensations, the idea of possible sensations - those which, 
while not being felt in the present, may be felt under certain future conditions. For 
him, the affections of the mind - such as Brendanian Vorstellungen - are immediately 
known, give testimony of themselves, and mental states arise from the outset as 
models of security by bringing within them the belief in their own existence. Thus, 
the existence of external things is based on a belief of psychological origin. This 
allows the mind, from a single experience, to infer a range of analogous sensations, 
which is due to the fact that current sensations actually have less importance than 
the possibilities of sensations: the first, arising from the contact of the subject with 
the object, are transient; the second, which implies a prediction or expectation, can 
be permanent, in such a way that “would allow us to distinguish the sensations of 
matter” (GARCIA-ROZA, 2008, p. 52). Precisely, what he called matter were these 
permanent possibilities of sensations which, guaranteed by past experience, do not 
present themselves as isolated sensations, but as groups of sensations as the objects 
of the external world - which, for perception, always present themselves as sensible 
qualities. This was what Freud had in mind when he posited the possibility of long 
succession of new impressions in the same associative chain.
Thus the open character of the object-representation does not allow 
Freud’s representational theory to be (as in Frege, for example) the expression 
of an individual subjective impression whose truth value would derive from the 
semantic demonstration of its objective sense in view of an existent reference. 
The presentation of word representation as complex representation and object 
representation as associative complex means abandoning the concept of impression 
inherited from empiricism and, with it, from the compulsory articulation between 
psychological elements (ideas) and physiological elements (impressions) that makes 
ideas the reproduction of impressions and their association results in the automatic 
association of those. What is represented in Freud is not the eidetic effect of sensible 
impressions but different associative series on a complex and inseparable whole that 
mobilizes the somatic record as well as the conscious psychological manifestation. 
The conscious system, in Freud’s typical materialism, is a qualitative modulation 
of the unconscious system, and both systems make up the psychic. As we have 
21
Gl
eis
so
n 
R. 
Sc
hm
idt
Revista Guairacá de Filosofia, Guarapuava-PR, V33, N2, P. 3-24, 2017.
issn 2179-9180
said, there is no “psychological scheme” without a “neurological scheme,” or as 
Garcia-Roza stresses, Freud’s psychological scheme “is a neurological esqueme” 
(GARCIA-ROZA, 2008, p. 46). 
By the way of conclusion
In his appropriation of the Brentanian philosophy of intentionality, Freud 
makes an interesting turn. If, as regards the content of the representation, it reveals 
his naturalistic and neurophysiological bias when affirming that the images that form 
the associations are registered in the nervous tissue, as for its referential character 
the psychoanalyst shows itself essentially Brentanian when affirming that the 
complex only acquires sense when the association of an acoustic image of the word-
representation with the visual image of the object-representation. Thus, he stresses 
that neither the conscious system nor the unconscious system are merely passive 
in the reception of stimuli external to the psychic apparatus. Nor would activity be 
an exclusive prerogative of the conscious system; what happens, indeed, is that the 
object-associative complex only makes sense by connecting to a word-representation 
at the level of conscious discourse – topos where disorders are treated, and repressions 
and repressions are revealed. The organism, in the neuronal register or at the 
cerebral level, also organizes such associative complexes through the facilitation 
and connections described in 1895’s Project - facilitations and connections over 
which the Ego exerts activity disturbing excitatory dynamics. Activity and passivity 
characterize both systems, which affect each other: consciousness (not substance, 
but quality or property) represents, affirms, denies, loves, or hates objects whose 
material is provided by the sensibility, while it somatizes the meaning attributed to 
the represented object of desire, and blushes at the lifting of censorship in the failed 
act. The object of desire is a rearrangement of the sensory data according to the 
representative capacity of the individual. Vorstellung, by Freud, like that of Brentano, 
is not subtracted from the mediational experiential situation that this concrete 
individual experiences; is not a synthetic abstraction for an absolute consciousness, 
but an open and communicable representation between individuals. Freud’s re-
elaborations on the theme of the drive throughout his work aim to respond to the 
problem of the status of the representational object in the context of the problematic 
psychic reality introduced through the contact with Brentano’s philosophy as well 
as to the somatic origin of intentional behavior. The postulation of a psychic reality 
“not to be confused with material reality” and whose organization, based on the 
sensibility of the organism, dispensed with the mechanical mirroring of external 
objects mediated by the bundles of fibers that communicated the endings of the 
nervous system with the brain tissue is still revolutionary. Thus it is possible to 
affirm with Barclay that regardless the metaphysical presuppositions of one and 
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the other, Brentano’s thesis of intentionality and Freudian representational theory 
manifest, as a principle, the primacy of the relational sense of representations and 
not their correspondential function, as if the psychic phenomena were intended to 
reflect a structure inherent in the objects whose stimuli they receive. Both master 
and student are committed to describing the representational modes that structure 
our psychic phenomena.
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